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Economics and history both strive to understand causation: economics using instrumental variables
econometrics and history by weighing the plausibility of alternative narratives. Instrumental variables
can lose value with repeated use because of an econometric tragedy of the commons bias: each successful
use of an instrument potentially creates an additional latent variable bias problem for all other uses
of that instrument – past and future. Economists should therefore consider historians’ approach to
inferring causality from detailed context, the plausibility of alternative narratives, external consistency,
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1.   History, Econometrics, and Economics  
Economics and history have not always got on.  Lazear’s (2000) advice that all social scientists adopt 
economists’ toolkit evoked a certain scepticism, for mainstream economics repeatedly misses major 
events, notably stock market crashes (Fischer 1933), and rhetoric can be mathematical as easily as 
verbal (McClosky 1985). Written by winners (Orwell 1944), biased by implicit assumptions (McLuhan 
1962); and innately subjective (Derrida 1967); history can also be debunked (Ford 1922, pp. 43-4). 
Fortunately, each is learning to appreciate the other. Business historians increasingly use tools from 
mainstream economic theory (Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin 2007); and economists display increasing 
respect for the methods of mainstream historians (Chandler, 1962; Wilkins 1970; Hertner and Jones 
1986; Jones 2005; and many others).   Each field has infirmities, but also strengths.  We propose that 
their strengths usefully complement each other in untangling the knotty problem of causation.   
This  complementarity  is  especially  useful  to  economics,  where  establishing  what  causes 
what is often critical to falsifying a theory.  Popper (1934) argues that scientific theory advances by 
successive falsifications, and makes falsifiability the distinction between science and philosophy. 
Economics is not hard science, but nonetheless gains hugely from a now nearly universal reliance on 
empirical  econometric  tests  to  invalidate  theory.  Edward  O.  Wilson  (1998,  p.  47)  puts  it  more 
bluntly:  “Everyone’s  theory  has  validity  and  is  interesting.  Scientific  theories,  however,  are 
fundamentally different. They are designed specifically to be blown apart if proved wrong; and if so 
destined,  the  sooner  the  better.”  Demonstrably  false  theories  are  thus  pared  away,  letting 
theoreticians focus on as-yet unfalsified theories, which include a central paradigm the mainstream 
of the profession regards as tentatively true (Kuhn 1976). The writ of empiricism is now so broad 
that younger economists can scarcely imagine a time when rhetorical skill, rather than empirical 
falsification, decided issues and the simplest regression was a day’s work with pencil and paper.  
But such was once the case. Relying on common sense, Malthus writes “Population, when 
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arithmetical ratio.” 
Edgeworth (1881), relying on introspection, affirms a gender-specific “capacity for pleasure’ (p. 77) 
and “a nice consiliance between the deductions of the utilitarian principle and the disabilities and 
privileges which hedge around modern womanhood (p. 79)”. Galbraith (1967, p. 36), relying on a 
keen intellect, declares that “competitors of General Motors are especially unlikely to initiate price 
reductions that might provoke further and retributive price cutting. … Everyone knows that the 
survivor of such a contest would not be the aggressor but General Motors.” And a little data can 
make  things  worse,  not  better,  for  Cold  War  era  editions  of  Samuelson’s  textbook,  Economics 
features graphs of Soviet GNP surpassing US GNP by the 1980s, or 1990s at the latest, (Levy and 
Peart 2009).  
These indisputably great economists wrote as they did because their introspection, common 
sense, intellects, and observations shaped their thoughts. Rhetorical flourish usefully prevented their 
economics from lapsing into a treatment for insomnia, but what these old masters did was not 
science, but something closer to history. For historians, too, weave common sense, introspection, 
intellect, and historical records into narratives that explain the past and illuminate the present.  
Their work added much to economics. Edgeworth, Samuelson, Walras, and Leontief brought 
algebraic clarity to elegant narratives spun by Smith, Mills, Voltaire, and Marx; and the combination 
was genuinely powerful. But so are folk tales, like Rudyard Kipling’s (1902) “Just So” Stories, which 
relate how the camel got his hump, how the leopard got his spots, and so on. Good narratives are 
compelling, socially edifying, and plausible explanations of why things are “just so.” The critic al 
difference is evidence.  
This lesson is now so deeply accepted that one seldom sees an economic theory article 
without  valid  econometric  evidence,  or  at  least  a  compelling  survey  of  supportive  empirical 
evidence. This is an unmitigated blessing. Empirical observation has pushed extremists towards the 
centre,  for  the  data  undermine  both  Marxism  and  perfect  markets.  The  21
st  century  Left 
contemplates a toilet-trained capitalism, (Krugman 2007; Sachs 2006, Stiglitz 2006); and the 21
st 
century Right frets over entrenched oligarchs (Rajan and Zingales 2004), the potential importance of 2 
 
fiscal policy (Feldstein 2009) and the optimal design of government (Buchanan 2003). Frenzied cries 
to abandon either markets or government can still be heard elsewhere on university campuses, but 
rarely amid economists. Our debates remain passionate, but are far more clinical and data-driven 
than before computers and mass storage ushered in the Age of Data. 
But economics is more than econometrics; it is an ongoing interplay of theory and evidence.  
Kuhn (1962) argues that science establishes paradigms – structural theories of what causes what – 
that  remain  valid  as  long  as  they  are  not  inconsistent  with  extant  empirical  evidence.  The 
overwhelming  success of econometrics  in  fundamentally  altering  the  way economists  think  and 
debate attracts attention, and therefore critics. Speaking for many of these, Fischer Black (1982) 
blasts econometrics for confusing “correlation with causation” and econometricians for terminology 
that propounds that confusion.   Black’s attack hit hard, and endogeneity bias, previously but one of 
many potential econometric problems, became “the” econometric problem.  
Thus rattled, economists returned to history, searching for tools with which to cultivate 
better econometrics. An assortment of econometric techniques based on instrumental variables 
became  “the”  response  to  Black’s  critique.  Economists  often  look  to  history  for  instrumental 
variables: factors determined long ago that cannot possibly “be caused” by things going on today. If 
paths of causation can be traced through such factors, the direction of causality can be inferred.     
This technique is very powerful where it can be applied – for example in natural experiments 
(Diamond and Robinson 2010).  However, econometrically useful natural experiments are few and 
far between, so economists often make do with iffier instrumental variables techniques. We argue 
that strict limitations on the validity of instrumental variables greatly limit their utility, and that 
repeated use of the same instrumental variables in related economic contexts undermines their 
validity in an econometric tragedy of the commons. However, we believe that economists might find 
other ways of establishing causality by recognizing history as more than a tool shed for instrumental 
variables. History provides contextual details, plausibility tests, external consistency checks, and a 
role for free will. Though not proof of causation, correlation is a smoking gun; and history can often 
supply sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict.  
 
2.   The Problem of Causation 
Economics is not the only place where correlation and causation get confused. Causality is a problem 
everywhere. For instance, physicians observe more heart attacks in people who are more obese and 
thus argue that obese people should diet to reduce the danger of heart failure. But is this really so? 
Perhaps people with weak hearts need more body fat, and dieting would worsen the danger of a 
heart attack. Or perhaps an unknown chronic viral infection causes both heart attacks and body fat 
accumulation, and dieting would only hide a cosmetic symptom of the virus while leaving it free to 
attack the heart.  
Medical science infers causality with double blind randomized trials. Equally obese people 
must be randomly assigned to either a treatment group or control group. People in the treatment 
group are put on a calorie restricted diet and people in control group are fed equally unpalatable 
food, designed to be indistinguishable from diet.  
Assignment to groups must be utterly random. A caring physician might put patients she 
thought in dire danger of heart attacks in the treatment group, but that would spoil the test. If more 
dieters than control patients subsequently die of heart attacks, she cannot tell whether dieting killed 
them or prevented even more from dying. But if the assignment were utterly random, any difference 
in the death rates can be credited to (or blamed on) the treatment.  
Second, neither the patients nor the physicians running the test may know who is in what 
group. People who know they have lost weight might act differently, or physicians might treat them 
differently, and  either  difference might  cause  difference  in  outcomes  between  the  two  groups. 
Dieting must be the only difference between the two groups, otherwise some other unknown factor 
might be the true cause of any difference in outcomes between the two groups.  3 
 
But if the test was done right, the difference between the treatment group patients’ old and 
new  diets “caused”  any  difference  in  heart  attack  rates  between  the  treatment  group  and  the 
control group. Such a difference-in-difference test allows a causal inference: putting obese patients 
on the diet prevents heart attacks.  
Double blind randomized trials are rare in economics. The divisions of Germany and Korea 
into capitalist and socialist halves might qualify as a test of socialism versus capitalism. The Iron 
Curtain arguably randomly assigned Germans to East and West Germany, and the Demilitarized Zone 
arguably did the same to Koreans.  Prior to the late 1980s, neither set of leaders, nor even Paul 
Samuelson, could divine the victor in the Cold War, so neither the citizens nor the economic policy 
makers on either side knew which was getting a treatment and which was getting a placebo.  
Can  we  then  conclude  that  different  economic  systems  caused  the  differences  in  living 
standards evident by the late 1980s? Perhaps ... But the Red Army seized northern Korea because 
the  Japanese  left  an  industrial  infrastructure  there,  so  the  division  was  not  truly  random.  The 
“treatment” might have been endogenous. Northern Koreans were more accustomed to factory 
work than their agrarian southern compatriots; but West Germany inherited a more comprehensive 
industrial base than did East Germany. East and West Germany differed in other ways. For example, 
what became East Germany was mainly Protestant in 1945, while the future West Germany held a 
substantial Roman Catholic minority. Perhaps religious traditions, a latent factor, really caused of 
any difference in economic prosperity. 
Wherever genuinely randomized and double blind trials occur, they are extremely useful.  
For example, Godley (2010) shows that Eastern European Jews who moved to London and New York 
at the turn of the century subsequently exhibited very different levels of entrepreneurship.  To the 
extent that the allocation of Jews to the two cities was random, this becomes a natural experiment 
on  how  environment  differences  affect  entrepreneurship.    Likewise,  Henry  and  Miller  (2009) 
compare  Barbados  and  Jamaica  –  Caribbean  island  nations  with  similar  social,  political,  and 
economic institutions at independence, but with different development policies thereafter.  To the 
extent  that  their  policy  differences  were  random  happenings,  this  natural  experiment  on  how 
economic policies affect economic outcomes.  
Unfortunately, such natural experiments are decidedly rare, so much causal inference in 
economics can be shaky.  For example, economies with dynamic financial systems grow faster (King 
and Levine 1993). Establishing this correlation is a useful exercise per se:  the exercise immediately 
falsifies any theories that imply a negative correlation or no correlation.  But too many theories 
remain on the table.  Does a dynamic financial system cause rapid growth; or does rapid growth 
supercharge  a  country’s  financial  system?  Or  does  a  predominantly  Protestant  population,  for 
example, cause both? This is more than an academic question, but multilateral financial institutions 
poured much money and effort into creating stock markets in post-socialist “transition” economies 
during the 1990s. Only if stock markets “cause” growth was this well spent.  
Black’s (1982) critique made economists and econometricians, in particular, keenly aware of 
the tenacious problems surrounding causal inferences. An arsenal of sophisticated techniques and 
penetrating insights has been deployed. However, impressive as they are, especially on a case-by-
case basis, their limitations remain binding at a more general and collective level - as we argue 
below.    
 
3.   Rummaging through the Tool Shed of History 
The great strength of the natural sciences is their basis in experiments in controlled laboratory 
conditions.  Randomized controlled experiments, usually on undergraduate subjects, can expose 
regularities in human behaviour that usefully restrict the set of admissible theories (Camerer 2010); 
and  the  use  of  subjects  in  developing  economies promises  further  insights but  also  raises  new 
problems (Deaton 2010).  
But many of the deepest questions in economics concern whole nations and the dealings 
between them.  The reader is invited to devise a controlled experiment to check whether or not 4 
 
bigger stock markets cause faster GDP growth. Electorates are disappointingly sceptical about letting 
economists use economies as laboratories to test unproven theories. And even when a theory is 
tested – say Keynesian economics in the Great Depression or Supply Side economics in the 1980s – 
we are rarely able to randomize or organize proper control samples. Economists can only look on 
with envy as a chemist fills two test tubes with the same reagent, treats one with a substance of 
interest, and notes the result.    
  The  best  economists  can  usually  do  in  such  circumstances  is  to  find  a  useful  natural 
experiment.  Nature  occasionally  treats  two  otherwise  identical  groups  differently  in  a  way  that 
resembles  what  economists  would  have  done  had  they  been  allowed  to  run  a  controlled 
experiment.  Such a natural experiment lets economists identify the causal effect of that treatment 
by  measuring  differences  between  the  groups  –  first  before  and  then  after  nature  ran  the 
experiment.  The “difference in these differences” is plausibly caused by the different way nature 
treated the two groups.  
Diamond and Robinson (2010) present several examples of such natural experiments that 
demonstrate the power of the technique.  But they also warn that such cases are rare; and that 
apparent natural experiments can be invalidated by subtle initial differences between the groups, or 
by additional perturbations that affected them differently.  
For example, consider an economist searching for a natural experiment to ascertain the 
effect of a government policy with implications for the validity of an economic theory.  Suppose the 
policy affects some people or firms more heavily than others. If the economist can sort the subjects 
in a way somewhat reminiscent of having randomly selected treatment and control groups, and then 
observe events unfold, causal inference is possible. The problem is finding a sorting mechanism that 
distinguishes  heavily  affected  from  lightly  affected  subjects  in  a  way  reminiscent  of  the 
randomization in medical trials. The groups must be identical in all other ways:  the only permissible 
difference between them is that the policy weighs heavily on some and lightly on others.   
The  favoured  solution  to  this  sorting  problem  is  instrumental  variables.  This  set  of 
econometric  techniques  encompasses  estimation  using  instrumental  variables  (IV)  regressions, 
simultaneous  equations  (SE),  generalized  method  of  moments  (GMM),  and  scores  of  related 
procedures. Though widely used, all these techniques are methodologically profoundly problematic. 
At least one valid instrumental variable must be found for each variable of interest in the estimation, 
and the criteria for validity are gruelling. These are: 
 
3.1  Endogeneity and Exogeneity 
A valid instrument must vary only in response to exogenous factors, that is factors determined by 
nature, God, or people whose actions do not depend on the dependent variable in the model. In the 
medical trial, a random assignment of patients to the two groups served as an exogenous way of 
distinguishing  observations.  An  instrument  also  sorts  observations  by  some  criterion  that  is 
unaffected by the dependent variables the economist would test.  
Economists often look to history here. For instance, countries’ colonial histories and legal 
systems  were  shaped  centuries  ago,  and  so  cannot  be  affected  by  their  current  economic 
performance. While instruments are sometimes taken from geography, linguistics, or other fields, 
economists seem happiest when rummaging about for instruments in history.  
But  does  the  arrow  of  time  really  make  things  so  simple?  Tobin  (1970)  stresses  that 
economics differs fundamentally from the natural sciences because people’s economic decisions 
depend on their expectations of future events; while the actions of pendulums, atoms, and planets 
do not. This teleological quality at the very heart of economic theory means that the future “causes” 
the  present  in  economics.  For  example,  shareholders’  expectations  about  future  dividends 
determine a stock’s price today. Can such temporal ricochets affect the flow of history in general?  
Let  us  explore  colonial  origin.  If  British,  French,  Spanish,  and  Portuguese  colonies  were 
scattered  randomly  throughout  the  world,  colonial  heritage  would  qualify  as  an  exogenous 
instrument. But France lost Canada in 1759 and abandoned the colony in 1763, demanding instead 5 
 
the sugar island Guadeloupe as the price of a peace treaty with Britain. British government officials 
disproportionately chose to make and defend claims of sovereignty over territories with agricultural 
potential; France, Spain, and Portugal for the most part did not.  
Is a British colonial heritage then the “cause” of Canada’s agricultural exports? Is a French 
colonial heritage the cause of Guadeloupe’s economic dependency? Perhaps; but Britain and France 
deliberately  colonized  places  with  certain  characteristics,  like  physicians  choosing  patients  with 
certain characteristics for their trials and thereby invalidating the initial randomization. How do we 
know that Canada’s agricultural potential didn’t cause it to end up under British suzerainty? Such 
questions may be answerable, but their asking demonstrates that historical variables, even very 
deep ones, are not a priori exogenous.   
Careful  researchers  must  thus  work  hard  to  validate  their  exogeneity  assumptions.  One 
approach is a careful reading of the historical record surrounding the data used to construct the 
instrumental  variable  (e.g.  Banerjee  and  Iver  2010).  A  non-random  initial  difference  between 
subjects might become evident over time; and another perturbation might affect different subjects 
differently.  Either could confound the natural experiment into presenting a false picture of what 
causes what.    
 
3.2  Weakness and Strength  
A valid instrument must be strongly correlated with the treatment. Economists generally cannot 
randomly assign observations to treatment and control groups; the instrument must do this. For 
example,  an  economist  might  be  interested  in  how  comparable  worth  wage  laws  affects 
unemployment, but is worried that unemployment might also affect a country’s labor laws. The 
economist therefore rummages about in history for an instrument and, let us suppose, selects the 
longitude of each country’s capital city.  
This variable might meet the endogeneity criterion above, but it is no good as an instrument 
unless  it  correlates  strongly  with  the  treatment.  After  all,  its  purpose  is  to  randomly  allocate 
countries to the treatment group, those with comparable worth laws, and the control group, those 
without such laws. Longitude can hardly do this if it is uncorrelated with the presence of those laws.  
Stock and Watson (2007) ascertain that instrumental variables achieving a joint F statistic 
below ten in a regression explaining the relevant treatment variable may have a weak instruments 
problem.  Though  they  provide  techniques  for  using  weak  instruments  nonetheless  in  certain 
situations,  failure  to  pass  a  weak  instruments  test  generally  consigns  otherwise  commendably 
instrumental variables to the dustbin of econometrics.  
Dismayed at longitude failing this test, the persevering economist might rummage further 
and, after a hundred or so tries, find the cosine of mean squared 1880s rainfall correlating with a 
dummy for comparable worth laws (p < 1%). Unfortunately, a variable, even a serenely exogenous 
one, that correlates with the treatment only incidentally, and after days of rummaging through the 
tool shed, is really merely a selected reflection of the treatment variable itself. Any endogeneity 
problems that afflict the original variable afflict its reflection too.  
Searching for false positives is no way to uncover strong instruments. We do not charge 
economists with rifling through history for Type II errors (Weimer 1986), but worry that editors and 
referees tempt authors by demanding they force causally circular data into inappropriate square 
instrumental variables econometrics. 
Weak  instrument  problems  are  especially  likely  to  arise  if  the  data  are  noisy  –  that  is, 
observed imperfectly.  For example, a highly acclaimed and carefully done study by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) uses mortality rates of early colonial settlers as an instrumental variable to sort countries by 
propensity to  establish  property  rights  protecting  institutions.  If  settlers  were  initially  randomly 
distributed  across  colonies,  and  property  rights  protecting  institutions  were  in  greater  demand 
where more settlers survive, this variable qualifies as exogenous. Nonetheless, a well-articulated 
debate between Abouy (2008) and Acemoglu et al (2005, 2006) about the accuracy of historical 6 
 
mortality rates demonstrates how data uncertainties can create a weak instruments problem even if 
the instrument is plausibly exogenous.          
 
3.3  Latency and Blatancy  
A valid instrument must not be thrown off by latent factors. The increasing popularity of historical 
variables as instruments makes this a growing problem.  
There are many importance cases where colonial origin, legal system origin, religious history, 
settler mortality, and the like are arguably exogenous and are correlated with treatment variables of 
interest.  For  example,  accepting  that  a  country’s  legal  system’s  origin  cannot  be  caused  by  its 
current financial dynamism, suppose an economist finds highly significantly more dynamic financial 
systems  in  Common  Law  countries.  She  rightly  uses  legal  origin  as  an  instrument  for  financial 
development; that is, she uses legal origin as an exogenous criterion for sorting countries in a way 
that also ends up sorting them by financial development. Then she can test whether the Common 
Law countries, which have more dynamic financial sectors purely by dint of having Common Law 
legal systems, grow faster than otherwise identical countries that lack dynamic financial systems 
purely by dint of lacking Common Law legal systems. If she includes appropriate control variables, so 
the countries truly are otherwise identical, this is arguably a valid test, and she can conclude with a 
straight face that financial development causes growth.  
Now suppose another economist want to see if agricultural productivity causes economy 
growth, and finds the latter variable also correlating highly with legal origin. The second economist, 
using legal origin as an instrument, regresses economic growth on agricultural productivity; and, 
finding a significant coefficient, concludes that agricultural productivity causes growth.  
This, unfortunately, does not fly. The second economist should have read the literature – in 
particular, the first economist’s paper. He knows financial development matters in this setting, and 
has a latent variable problem in his regressions unless he includes that variable too. Moreover, 
publication  of  the  second  economist’s  paper  means  the  first  economist’s  article  is  no  longer 
convincing as regards causality. She now has a latent factor problem, for she failed to control for 
agricultural  productivity,  an  endogenous  variable  that  the  second  economist  proved  to  be 
important. The key point here is that each subsequent paper that reuses an instrument in a shared 
context contributes an additional latent factor problem to all the existing studies.  
Tragically, commonly used instrumental variables lose value with overuse. This because the 
instrumental variables are non-exclusionary, the first economist to use an instrument cannot prevent 
others from using it too; and because instrumental variables can be rivalrous, each successive use 
potentially compromises the instrument’s validity in every previous and subsequent use. Absent a 
comprehensive  multinational  agreement  enforcing  their  patenting,  instrumental  variables  are 
stymied by a classic Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 1968).  
 
3.4  An Econometric Tragedy of the Commons 
The requirements of exogeneity, strength (no weak instruments problems), and blatancy (no latent 
factor  problems)  severely  limit  the  supply  of  valid  instrumental  variables.  This  leads  to  their 
recycling. Each individual study may look econometrically rigorous – its instruments exogenous and 
strong. But authors of literature reviews, who must evaluate the collective contributions of many 
such studies, cannot but doubt the validity of each study given the others.  
  Economists have long stressed internal consistency.  An economist generally may not begin a 
proof assuming a logarithmic utility function and then switch to a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) utility function part way through.
1   But even the best economics journals have no problem 
                                                           
1 Logarithmic utility assumes a subject’s utility (hedonic pleasure) from consuming C to be a function of the 
form U = a log(C)., while constant elasticity of substitution utility assumes U = C
1-a/(1-a).  The two are 
equivalent if a is 1, but not otherwise.  Economic theorists often choose a functional form to make the algebra 
easier; however results based one form often do not follow if another is used instead.      7 
 
with logarithmic utility in one article and CES in the next, even if each article is utterly devastated by 
the assumption used in the other.  
This lack of concern for external consistency is a challenge to theorists, but a disaster for 
empirical economics when issues of causation arise. An effect that is blatantly significant in one 
study is necessarily potentially latently significant in all others that explore the same economic 
questions, and probably in studies that examine many related economic questions too. Individual 
articles can sustain a veneer of consistency, but the collective literature cannot.    
  A Tragedy of the Commons has led to an overuse of instrumental variables and a depletion 
of the actual stock of valid instruments for all econometricians. Each time an instrumental variable is 
shown to work in one study, that result automatically generates a latent variable problem in every 
other study that has used or will use the same instrumental variable, or another correlated with it, in 
a similar context.  We see no solution to this. Useful instrumental variables are, we fear, going the 
way of the Atlantic cod.  
 
4.   Learning from Repeating History  
Fortunately,  there  are  ways  we  can  learn  about  causation  from  history  without  rummaging  for 
instrumental variables. A prime example of this is the event studies of financial economics. A second 
is Granger causality (G-causality) tests, widely used by macroeconomists.  
 
4.1  Event Studies 
Event studies (Campbell et al. 1997, c. 4) are perhaps the most direct test for causality available to 
economists. For example, a financial economist who wanted to see if comparable worth laws add 
value  to  firms  might  identify  the  precise  dates  on  which  each  US  state  with  such  laws  first 
announced them. If the value of a portfolio containing the stocks of all the firms operating in the 
announcing state rises significantly relative to the value of a portfolio containing all other stocks on 
each such event date, the financial economist is on passably solid ground inferring that comparable 
worth “causes” increased firm values.  
The  power of event  studies  lies  in  repetition of  history.  If  each  of  a  large  collection of 
economically similar event corresponds to similar patterns in the data, we can infer that something 
significant is happening. In this example, each state’s announcement repeats the event, and if each 
repetition is associated with a similar relative stock value hike for the firms in the affected state, a 
pattern is evident and causality can be inferred.  
An inference of causality is justified by Ockham’s Razor: that the legal reform causes stock 
prices to change is reasonable because the reverse is manifestly implausible. For stock price hikes to 
cause the laws, state legislators would have to patiently monitor the ticker tape until a day when the 
stocks of firms in their state, and only those stocks, rise; and then burst forth with news of new labor 
laws.  
However, even here, we must beware of latent factors. For example, if states tend to adjust 
their minimum wages whenever they adopt comparable worth laws, the minimum wage might be 
causing the stock price changes.  
Also, insignificance in an event study cannot prove an absence of causation, for economic 
decision-makers’ expectations of the future again come into play. If Iowa’s adoption of comparable 
worth labour laws were all but assured months ahead of their actual unveiling, the unveiling would 
not  move  stock  prices.  Investors  would  long  ago  have  adjusted  their  expectations  about  the 
dividends of Iowan firms, and little or nothing would happen when those expectations were realized.  
The event study technique is thus weakened by investors’ collective learning. But learning is 
usually incomplete – as long as some probability of history following an alternative path remains 
non-zero until the event actually occurs, event study can be informative about causality. Moreover, 
many  interesting  economic  phenomena  are  fundamentally  amenable  to  perfect  prediction  by 
neither  econometricians  nor  the  people  they  model  (Nelson  1972;  Roll  1986;  Diebold  1998; 8 
 
Caballero 2010; and others). The unfolding of history reveals new information and human ingenuity 
creates innovations – neither, by definition, is predictable; yet both are central to economics.  
4.2  Granger Causality Tests 
Something akin to an event study is sometimes econometrically feasible in panel data. Granger 
(1969) causality tests exploit a definition of causal relationships between random variables proposed 
by Wiener (1956): one variable "Granger-causes" (or "G-causes") another if a forecast of the second 
variable based only on its past values is made significantly more accurate by using past values of the 
first variable as well.  
  In practice, these forecasts are almost always linear regressions, so the test is really about 
one variable “G-causing” another if a regression of the latter variable on its own past values and past 
values of the former variable has a significantly higher R
2 than a regression of the latter variable on 
its own past values alone.  
For the test to be valid, both variables must be stationary – they must not have a common 
trend. Trends are removed by taking first differences, second differences, or if necessary, even 
higher order differences, until a panel of stationary data are obtained. This is reasonable, for if one 
variable causes another, changes in the first variable presumably also cause changes in the second.  
Like other tests of causality, this approach requires that the economist worry about latent 
factors, for if a third variable “causes” both of the variables being tested for Granger causality, a 
false positive can result. And, as with event studies, an absence of evidence of causality is not 
evidence of its absence.  
Granger causality tests are perhaps uniquely vulnerable to the fundamental teleology of 
economic theory. If central bankers adjust the money supply based on their expectations of future 
GDP growth, a Granger causality test might erroneously show the money supply “causing” GDP 
growth. Because economics is about people’s decision making under uncertainly, expectations about 
the future cause present decisions. If those expectations turn out to be correct in general (Muth 
1961), the future can seem to cause the past.  
Event studies are less vulnerable to this critique because stock prices can be observed at 
very  high  (daily  and  intraday)  frequency  and,  if  announcement  times  are  sufficiently  precise, 
Ockham’s razor can cut away alternative causality scenarios. For example, firms usually announce 
major  strategic  decisions  after  the  stock  exchange closes  for  the  day.  An  event  study  of  firms’ 
announcements of diversifying takeovers finding their stock price the next day significantly below 
the  closing  price  just  prior  to  these  announcements  is  consistent  with  diversification  causing 
shareholders to revise downwards their estimates of the firm’s value. Reverse causality would entail 
CEOs,  foreseeing  stock  price  drops,  deciding  to  announce  diversifying  takeovers.  This  is  not 
impossible,  but  it  is  implausible.  Economic  theory  provides  many  reasons  for  diversification  to 
destroy value, but no reasons for CEOs to act as reverse causality would demand.   
However, Granger causality can work where event studies do not.  Event studies can be 
impractical if the variable of interest is observed only at a low frequency (quarterly or annually) and 
a long enough time series to permit meaningful statistical tests does not exist.  Moreover, if the 
variables of interest exhibit sluggish adjustments or are obscured by substantial noise, as many 
macroeconomic variables and product prices can be, Granger causality tests can fail to detect bona 
fide causal relationships. 
 
5.   Implausibly Deniable Causality 
Absence of evidence of a given direction of causation is not evidence of its absence, and is certainly 
not evidence of causation in the reverse direction. Neither instrumental variables regressions, nor 
event  studies,  nor  Granger  causality  tests  can  assert  an  absence  of  causal  connection.  That  a 
negative cannot be proven is an epistemological truism, but that doesn’t prevent economists from 
trying (Summers and Stambough 1986).  9 
 
  Statistical insignificance in an event study does not mean the events definitively do not 
cause changes in stock prices. The event dates might be insufficiently precise, or stock prices might 
be  too  volatile  to  detect  the  signal  reliably,  or  investors  might  have  expected  the  event  with 
sufficient probability that its price impact was negligible. Granger causality tests can also be muddied 
by  the  timing  of  expectations  revisions,  by  noisy  data,  and  by  insufficiently  long  or  excessively 
persistent panel data.  
An absence of significance in an instrumental variables framework likewise does not mean 
an absence of causality. The instrument may not be strong enough, latent variables may lie hidden in 
the statistical background, or the effect may be obscured by the noise. Even more importantly, an 
absence of significance in an instrumental variables framework does not imply reverse causality. 
Proving  reverse  causality  requires  specifying  a  regression  that  represents  the  reverse  causality, 
complete with its own control variables and exogenous strong instruments for its endogenous right-
hand side variables.  
 
6.   Dusting off History 
History ought to be intrinsically interesting to economists. Economics seeks to explain patterns in the 
progress of individuals and collectives – communities, corporations, and nations. History documents 
the  past  that  generated  economists’  datasets,  and  so  ought  to  arouse  economists’  intellectual 
curiosity. But we propose that the study of history offers economics much more.  
History provides context – an intensity of information around a few observations – and this 
can sometimes be as useful as a large dataset. A good example of this is Alfred Chandler’s (1962) 
Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of American Industrial Enterprise.  This work lays out, 
in intricate detail, the inner workings of DuPont, General Motors, Sears, and Standard Oil as they 
adopted a new corporate structure that he dubs the M-form The degree of detail, based on careful 
documentation of how key decisions came to be make, shows that  the corporations’ strategies must 
determine their structures, not the  converse.  These observations  continue to shape studies of 
business strategy, and much recent work also applies Chandler’s strategy for ascertaining patterns of 
causality.   For example, Jones and Khanna (2006), surveying the business history literature, point 
out how historical information on early European multinationals illuminate underlying causes of 
their diversification and development into business groups.  
Historical  studies  have  a  collective  methodology:  external  consistency  matters.    History 
subjects competing narratives to ongoing tests of plausibility, and this narrative format forces an 
external consistency. To sustain credibility, a good historical narrative must connect the “dots” of all 
relevant historical events with causal links. And while historians debate the importance of individuals 
as  opposed  to  impersonal  forces,  history  is more  amenable  to  the  concept of  free will  than  is 
neoclassical economics; and causality is far more interesting if there is free will. In sum, we believe 
more attention to history offers economists more defensible arguments about causality.  
 
6.1  The Importance of Context  
Economics  strives  for  simplification  that  reveals  underlying  causal  principles.  The  detail  and 
contextualization favoured by historians complicates economists’ models. While some historians can 
be accused of excessively imaginative reconstruction of causality and deliberately biased searches 
for  historical  evidence  supporting  their  favoured  narratives,  economists  are  hardly  immune  to 
mistaken musings and confirmation bias. But historians’ purpose is, first and foremost, a sustained 
effort to reveal causality. That shared purpose makes history intrinsically interesting to economists.  
Historical studies about economic and financial events offer chronological sagas of unfolding 
developments. They link outcomes to events, reactions to actions, and (perhaps most importantly to 
economists) historically consequential errors to critical decision-makers’ private preferences and 
incomplete information. History is composed of narratives that “connect the dots” in causal terms.  10 
 
History,  unlike  economics,  pays  great  attention  to  external  consistency.  Historians’ 
narratives gain credibility by their finesse at connecting all the dots. This attention to context can be 
illuminating.  
For example, Germany and Japan are “bank-based” economies: their big businesses rely on 
banks for capital and seldom issue new shares onto their stock markets. In contrast, Anglo-Saxon 
countries are “stock market-based” economies: their big companies rely extensively on share issues 
to finance growth, and long-term bank loans are markedly less important. An econometrician would 
correctly  detect  no  indication  that  one  system  causes  higher  living  standards  than  the  other. 
However, an historian might dissent. Both Japan and Germany industrialized in the late 19
th and 
early  20
th  century,  and  both  were  stock-market-based  economies  in  their  high  growth  decades 
(Fohlin  2005;  Morck  and  Nakamura  2007).  Banks  rose  to  dominance  amid  Japan’s  post-war 
reconstruction (Morck and Nakamura 2005) and under Germany’s National Socialist government 
(Fohlin 2005), though Bismarck began shifting German regulations towards favoring banking much 
earlier (Mitchie 2008).  Indeed, that any major economy has ever industrialized successfully without 
a large stock market is unclear (Rajan and Zingales 2003)
2.  
This example highlights the importance of path dependence. Germany and Japan both had 
to finance costly large -scale post-war reconstruction, and both used vastly expanded banking 
systems to finance this.   Path dependence tends to und ermine  assumptions of  ergodicity, the 
premise that time-series and cross-section variation are statistical substitutes. In this case, the cross-
section is silent, but a few historical observations are informative.  
By putting their current financial systems in context, history gives  economists  a better 
understanding of their data. The detailed economic histories of Japan and Germany are case studies, 
not data. But their wealth of detail provides a context in which to evaluate broader hypotheses and 
disentangle the effects of path dependence.  For example, Haber’s (2010) comparative description of 
the  development  of  banking  in  the  US,  Brazil,  and  Mexico  does  precisely  this.    The  value  of 
descriptive history in addressing these sorts of issues is surveyed in Jones and Khanna (2006), and 
reiterated in Morck and Yeung (2007).  In this way, a few observations – perhaps even just one – can 
provide an intensity of information that allows inferences even a large dataset might not reveal.  
 
6.2  Competing Narratives and Ockham’s Razor 
Such exercises are useful to economics because the uncovering of previously unknown historical 
evidence and the unfolding of current events into the tapestry of history provide ongoing tests of 
competing narratives. Ockham’s razor shapes the tapestry: narratives rendered less plausible fall 
away before narratives rendered more plausible.  
History thus has its own way of ascertaining validity. An historical narrative must be logical 
and backed by evidence. Historians construct, modify, extend, and prune their narratives to maintain 
internal and external consistency.  Sometimes this reinforces established narratives; other times it 
leads to their replacement by another narrative in a process, much as new paradigms overturn old 
ones in the sciences (Kuhn 1962).  In both cases, old paradigms can be tenacious, and perhaps hang 
on longer than they should.  Indeed, really major changes must often await a new generation of 
scholars, with less human capital invested in the old paradigm.  Thus Samuelson’s famous quip:  
“funeral by funeral, economics does make progress” (Wilson 1998, p. 52).  This happens in sciences 
too:  quantum mechanics took over physics not because many physicists changed their minds, but 
because  old  physicists  retired  and  young  physicists  found  the  new  paradigm  convincing  (Kragh 
2002).    Evolution  took  even  longer  to  become  the  central  paradigm  of  biology  (Larsen  2004). 
Economic theories of monopoly, macroeconomics, and individual choice, to name but a few, have 
undergone similar transformations, and some of these may well have required funerals, or at least 
retirements, to take hold. History can sometimes help the upstarts, as e.g., with the economics of 
multinational  firms  where  historians  show  that  US  students  of  multinationals  that  European 
                                                           
2 Even communist China has established stock markets.  Their contribution towards that country’s further 
development remains to be seen.      11 
 
companies as far back into the nineteenth century had been enthusiastic multinational investors as 
their US counterparts in the twentieth century.  (Wilken 1970, 1974; Hertner and Jones 1986; Jones 
2005; and others).  Similarly, Chandler’s (1962) pioneering work on the importance of economies of 
scale and scope dominated the field for a generation, but the data ultimately led Scranton (1997) to 
showcases  the  persistent  importance  of  specialized  production,  alongside  mass  production,  in 
propelling US industrialization in the late 19
th and early 20
th centuries.  Chandler’s finding that US, 
UK, German and Japanese firms progressed from family control to the stewardship of professional 
managers likewise caused a generation of economists to view this as the baseline paradigm of 
business everywhere.  This too was qualified by historical work showing those four countries to be 
atypical, and demonstrating that ongoing family-control over large business empires continues to be 
the norm in most countries (Morck 2005). Yet another example is the broad influence of Ford’s 
(1922) philosophy of management until business historians entered the debate (Tolliday and Zeitlin 
1987).   
The  credibility  of  each  narrative  depends  not  only  on  its  ability  to  “connect  the  dots” 
between past events, but also to explain new dots that arise from archaeological digs, previously 
forgotten  archives,  and  the  unfolding  of  history  from  current  events.  These  tests  are  not 
econometric, but they are powerful nonetheless. Narratives that were once deeply compelling can 
be cast aside when they fail to connect important dots. For example, the narrative of Western 
colonialism civilizing the benighted savages of Africa and Asia could not connect the dots of two 
World Wars, and is now itself an historical curiosity.  
The connecting of such dots can be every bit as painstaking as the careful assembly of a large 
econometric database.  For example, Engerman and Fogel (1974) assemble historical data on slaves 
in the American south, and argue that their owners took good care of their property to maintain its 
value, as economic theory would predict.  A spirited dispute followed over the quality of their 
historical data (Fogel 2003; Gutman 2003).  
A powerful example of historians connecting causal dots is Kindleberger’s (1978) historical 
analysis of financial manias, panics, and crashes. Kindleberger sets out detailed histories of each 
major financial crisis from the advent of modern stock markets in the early 1600s to the 1970s. He 
distils from these histories a common trajectory that each crisis follows: an economic dislocation 
that creates genuine economic profit opportunities, an inrush of capital to fund these, a popular 
demand for deregulation to allow broader participation, a continued capital inflow after the profit 
opportunities  are  exhausted,  manic  episodes  of  capital  chasing  illusory  high  returns  from  stock 
markets to commodities to real estate, a crash, and a popular  fury with financiers that usually 
heralds  tough  new  regulations  –  which  persist  until  the  next  cycle.  The  neat  obedience  of  all 
subsequent  financial  crises  to  Kindleberger’s  (1978)  thesis  enhances  its  credibility.  Alternative 
narratives  based  on  stock  market  efficiency  have  fallen  aside,  and  Kindleberger’s  remains  the 
“narrative to beat”.  
 
6.3  A Broad-Minded Consistency 
History is a correspondence between individuals, generations, and eras, in which one writer cannot 
easily ignore the scrawls of the others. The last point in particular contrasts starkly with economists’ 
precise  attention  to  the  internal  consistency  of  every  article,  rather  than  external  consistency 
between studies. Above, we stressed that using a variable on both the left-hand side and right-hand 
side of OLS regressions seriously bothers economists if done within an article; but not if a few pages 
of references, a title, and an abstract intervene. This narrow-minded consistency is more than an 
econometric problem.  
Our reading of the literature suggests that historians  can be more broad-minded about 
consistency. More respect for history would, we think, promote a long-overdue regard for external 
consistency across studies in economics. Good historians connect the dots across broad patterns of 
human endeavour. Even historians focused on a relatively narrow national or temporal band must 12 
 
connect  facts  in  geography  to  facts  in  politics,  climate  history,  psychology,  and  (of  course) 
economics. This expanse of context is rare in economics. 
For example, development economics was long founded on the premise that poor countries 
were basically like the United State, but poorer (Lal 2000). This perspective justified massive foreign 
aid. When this effort succumbed to widespread corruption, attention turned to structural reforms 
designed to make developing countries more like poor versions of the United States, so that future 
aid  initiatives  might  find  better  traction.  This  drastically  oversimplifies  a  complicated  field  of 
economics, but we believe the simplification captures something essential: a lack of concern for 
external consistency. 
Historians studying the problem of persistent poverty provide more context, and this lets 
them expose interesting patterns that can be checked for consistency across many similar historical 
events.  For  example,  Haber  (1997),  writing  on  Latin  America,  chronicles  episodes  of  aborted 
industrialization, and discerns a pattern: the region’s elites are enriched by industrialization, but fear 
losing control should institutions ever develop fully. Haber et al (2008) and North et al. (2009) draw 
from  the  histories  of  many  countries  to  document  patters  that  consistently  distinguish 
developmental successes stories from developmental failures.  
While such economic historians rely on econometric evidence where it is credible, their 
narratives do not rely fundamentally on F-tests or likelihood ratios. Their claim to legitimacy is that 
they start from detailed information-rich case studies, connect the dots to discern plausible patterns 
of causality, and demonstrate a generality to these patterns by demonstrating a broader external 
consistency with collected previous works.  
 
6.4  Taking Free Will Seriously 
Economics was deeply affected by the philosophy of causal determinism, which the natural sciences 
embraced  throughout  the  19
th  century.  That  philosophy  is  most  famously  espoused  by  Laplace 
(1814) thus,  
 
“We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the 
cause of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that 
set nature in motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if 
this  intellect  were  also  vast  enough  to  submit  these  data  to  analysis,  it  would 
embrace in a single formula the movements of the greatest bodies of the universe 
and those of the tiniest atom; for such an intellect nothing would be uncertain and 
the future just like the past would be present before its eyes.”  
 
For this intellect, dubbed “Laplace’s demon”, every event is a cog in a mechanical chain stretching 
back to the beginning of the universe.  
The neoclassical synthesis of the 1870s, which still largely defines microeconomic theory, 
drew heavily from the physics of the time (Mirowski 1991) and presents human beings as part of this 
cosmos. Human beings are causally deterministic utility maximizing machines, whose decisions are 
fully determined by their predefined preferences and budget constraints, which are fully determined 
by a mechanical chain stretching back into the depths of time. In such a world, causation is both 
simple and uninteresting, for nothing is exogenous except the prime mover who set the clockwork 
moving eons ago. Yet, this analytical framework came to guide causal interpretations of inputs, 
changes, and outputs in the econometrics of the Age of Data.  
In  truth,  economists  have  never  really  accepted  causal  determinism.  Even  the  most 
committed  neo-classicists  contemplate  exogenous  interventions:  Acts  of  God,  and  even  policy 
changes, that somehow originate outside such rows of dominos, and that send deterministic rows of 
utility maximizing human decisions toppling down alternative paths.  
Physics  long  ago  abandoned  causal  determinism;  indeed,  quantum  mechanics  left  it  no 
choice  by  adding  intrinsic  uncertainty  to  time  and  space.  This,  in  turn,  freed  philosophy  to 13 
 
contemplate human free will. Economics hardly noticed these changes. Yet if free will exists, human 
decisions must be exogenous in the deepest philosophical meaning of the term, and the origins of all 
economically interesting causal chains of events.    
Historians  have  long  argued  about  the  importance  of  individuals,  as  opposed  to 
deterministic  forces.  If  free  will  matters,  individuals  are  important.  The  cognitive  processes, 
emotions, compulsions, and desires within human decision makers are the ultimate causes of the 
phenomena economists study.  
History records autobiographical and biographical information that can tell us what people 
were thinking, worried about, or pursuing when they did what they did. Perhaps economists might 
investigate these records to see what they reveal about what caused key decision makers to decide 
as they did. Fundamental advances in understanding phenomena like entrepreneurship can emerge 
from ascertaining the constraints, knowledge, motives, and cognitive processes of key decision-
makers (Casson 1993; Casson et al. 2005).  
Cognitive dissonance and other behavioural biases surely cause people to misremember 
such things ex post, and even to lie about them deliberately.  But the historical record contains real 
time archives that can occasionally reveal the sometimes uncomplimentary motives that caused 
particular chains of events to unfold.  Of course, archives can be biased, deliberately manipulated, or 
released selectively, and careful business historians are alert for this; but archives can also upend 
aged decision-makers sanitized accounts (Cox and Wallace 2002).  
 
7.  Conclusion 
We conclude that Black’s critique of econometrics, his entirely reasonable argument that correlation 
is not causation, may well have been taken too seriously by economists. As Tufte (2003) equally 
reasonably points out, "Correlation is not causation but it sure is a hint." More precisely, correlation 
is  a  necessary,  but  not  sufficient,  condition  for  causation.  This  makes  tests  for  correlations  in 
economic data important. Econometric tests for causality may well be much less useful, for they can 
often be extraordinarily difficult to do well. The progress of economics may well be better served by 
careful  and  reliable  tests  for  correlations  than  by  flawed  tests  asserting  or  denying  causality
  How then can economists ascertain what causes what? Here we conclude economists might 
make better use of history. History is far more than a tool shed for instrumental variables. History is 
filled out with nuances that contextualize events. History is composed of competing narratives that 
must  “connect  the  dots”  or  lose  credibility.  History  records  autobiographical  and  biographical 
information that can tell us what people were thinking, worried about, or pursuing when they did 
what they did. History is a correspondence between individuals, generations, and eras, in which one 
writer cannot easily ignore the scrawls of the others.  
Popper  (1934),  and  especially  Lakatos  (1976),  argue  that  science  progresses  by  the 
successive falsification of whole theories, not individual hypotheses. This is why a broader respect 
for external consistency is needed if economics is ever to gain acceptance as a science. This is also 
why  economics  must  come  to  grips  with  the  fact  that  its  observations  are  usually  context-
dependent.  Statistical tests for causality are obviously useful once a theory has been enunciated, 
but contextualized observation is more often the source  of the broad pictures and frameworks that 
coalesce into the theories we test – in science (Feyerabend 1975) and economics (Khanna and Jones 
2006).  Indeed, Adam Smith (1976) built his theories, arguably the basis of the whole of modern 
economics, around detailed qualitative observations of the workings of a pin factory.  
Econometrics has served economists well, and continues to do so.  But it cannot answer 
every question, and has especially intractable problems with many questions of causation.  We do 
not call for any unwinding of past work; but for a reinvestment in history so that the complimentary 
relationship between statistical analysis and historical investigation we describe above can step in 
where econometrics falters.    
There is a natural complementary that benefits both economists and historians; but we (as 
rational and self-interested economists) perceive primarily the benefits to our field.  Economics as a 14 
 
discipline has standardized a powerful methodology, which may indeed be useful in other fields 
(Lazear 2000; Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin 2007). Relying on theories of constrained optimization 
and equilibrium, tempered by behavioural regularities and the availability of information, economics 
builds empirically falsifiable statements and guides the collection and interpretation of historical 
information. Some of these statements are readily amenable to econometric tests, but others – 
especially  those  about  one  thing  causing  another  –  are  more  difficult  to  test.    We  argue  that 
economists can in turn look to history for help here.  Economists already make use of repetitions of 
history in the forms of event studies and Granger causality tests.  But economists might also gain 
insights about causality by attending to details of context, weighing the plausibility of competing 
narratives, assessing external consistency, and studying the constraints, motives, and recollections 
of key decision-makers – either directly or through archives.  All of these methodologies surely also 
have their problems too.  But we believe them to be lesser than the difficulties inherent in using 
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